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One of the hallmarks of the U.S. financial system is that it has become increasingly 
“democratized.”  Encouraged by government policies and spurred by market forces, financial 
institutions and markets over time have gradually expanded credit to borrowers who in earlier 
times could not have qualified for credit.  In mortgage markets especially, the government has 
played an important catalytic role:  creating a secondary market in mortgages through various 
“government-sponsored” enterprises, extending federal insurance to mortgages for low- and 
moderate- income (LMI) homebuyers, and by imposing “community reinvestment” obligations 
on depository institutions that are aimed at encouraging lending to LMI borrowers and 
residents of LMI geographic areas.  In the 1990s, the growth of the “subprime” lending market 
– among lenders and the investment banks that have “securitized” the loans – has led to a 
major increase in mortgage lending to low income households, and especially minorities.  As a 
result, approximately two-thirds of Americans now own their own homes – the highest rate of 
homeownership in our history. 
 
  Nonetheless, increasing attention has been paid in recent years to various abusive 
practices in the subprime lending market that have been collectively labeled as “predatory 
lending.”  Although the term itself has not been precisely defined, it has come generally to 
refer to mortgages extended under terms that are more onerous to borrowers than if they were 
more fully informed about the loans themselves and the alternative sources of finance that may 
be open to them.  In response, the Congress has enacted legislation cracking down on certain 
especially unfair lending practices, while imposing reporting obligations on both depository 
and non-depository lenders designed to shed sunlight on the extent of high-cost lending.  In 
November and December 2000, the Federal Reserve – the principal federal regulator charged 
with collecting and publicizing this information – issued two proposals to expand the coverage 
of these reporting requirements. 
 
  This report highlights the potential danger to the populations thought to be most 
victimized by predatory lending – minority and low-income individuals and families generally 
– of already enacted or proposed state and local ordinances or states that extend beyond federal 
law.  In effect, these regulatory provisions constitute a new type of “usury” statutes, which 
once were prevalent throughout the country, but have since been abandoned – except in this 
new guise as an attack on predatory lending. Moreover, the implicit connection drawn in some 
of these laws (or their preambles) between “high cost” lending, which appropriately reflect the 
risks of lending to customers outside the prime market, and “predatory” lending, which is 
inherently abusive and already punishable under federal law, is simply incorrect. 
 
                                                 
1 The author is Vice President and Director, Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. He has 
prepared this report on behalf of the American Bankers Association. The views are his own and not those of the 




While the motivation behind added legislation aimed at predatory lending is 
understandable and commendable, the fact is that virtually all of the practices complained of 
are already against federal law.  Furthermore, federal law contains numerous disclosure 
requirements relating to mortgage loans generally, and especially high-cost loans.  Additional 
statutory measures at the state and local level at this point run a significant risk of 
unintentionally cutting off the flow of funds to creditworthy borrowers.  This is a very real 
threat and one that should be seriously considered by policy makers at all levels of 
government, especially in light of the multiple, successful efforts that federal law in particular 
has made to increase lending in recent years to minorities and low income borrowers.  
 
The more prudent course is for policy makers at all levels of government to wait for 
more data to be collected and reported by the Federal Reserve so that enforcement officials can 
better target practices that may be unlawful under existing statutes.  In the meantime, Congress 
should provide the federal agencies charged with enforcing existing statutes with sufficient 
resources to carry out their mandates, as well as to support ongoing counseling efforts to 
educate vulnerable consumers about the alternatives open to them in the credit market and the 
dangers of signing mortgages with unduly onerous terms.  There is also an encouraging new 
development from the private marketplace – the voluntary release of credit scores – that 
potential borrowers will be able to use in improving their ability to compare mortgage terms 
before they assume such debt.  More information provides an important market-driven way to 
help level the playing field between lenders and otherwise uninformed borrowers. 
 
This report is structured in the following manner.  Section I begins by documenting the 
growing importance of subprime lenders to underserved borrowers, as well as the efforts by the 
federal government to encourage lending to such borrowers – efforts that recent evidence 
suggests have paid off.  
 
Section II next describes certain lending abuses in this market that have occurred or are 
alleged to have occurred in recent reports on predatory lending.  In the process, it highlights 
how these abuses generally already are prohibited under existing federal law.  Section II also 
identifies reporting requirements that now apply or that have been proposed for lenders in the 
subprime market.  The section concludes by making clear that subprime or high cost lending – 
to borrowers of greater risk than prime borrowers – should not be routinely equated with 
“predatory” lending. 
 
Section III summarizes some of the current and proposed local ordinances that have 
gone beyond federal law, and that currently or would penalize lenders for extending mortgages 
on terms that would not be unlawful or that would require reporting under federal law.  Such 
legislation threatens the availability of credit to precisely those borrowers thought to be most 
victimized by predatory lending, and thus entail the risk of reversing the progress that federal 
law has made in encouraging the flow of credit to these borrowers.  
 
Section IV concludes by suggesting that the prudent course for policy makers at all 
levels of government is to enforce existing law and examine the data that lenders must report 










I.  The Importance of the Subprime Mortgage Market 
 
In the days when deposit and lending rates were regulated or limited – as recently as 
1980 – credit was rationed.  Good or prime borrowers got credit, others didn’t.  
 
One of the major financial innovations over the past two decades, and especially in the 
1990s, has been the development of credit rating tools that measure the relative risks of 
potential default of different borrowers.  These credit scores are now used by a wide range of 
lenders, depository and non-depository institutions alike, to help determine interest rates and 
other terms to offer to borrowers that take account of the risks of non-payment.  
 
In particular, borrowers with a history of always paying their utilities, credit card, and 
other bills on time often qualify as “prime” borrowers, and thus are eligible for credit on the 
most competitive terms available.  Many borrowers, however, do not have perfect payments 
histories; others may not have significant assets to fall back upon; and others may be self-
employed and have wide fluctuations in their annual incomes.  Although borrowers in each of 
these categories may thus not qualify for credit in the prime market, they may well be eligible 
for credit in the “subprime” market, where because of the greater risks, interest rates and up-
front fees are higher and loan amounts are typically smaller than those available in the prime 
market.  As discussed further below, the leading credit scoring company – Fair Isaac – will be 
releasing credit scores to borrowers beginning in March 2001.
2  This is an important 
development that should enhance the competitiveness of the subprime mortgage market, to the 
benefit of borrowers who seek credit in that market or who will now learn that they deserve to 
receive credit as a prime borrower. 
 
As it is, however, risk-related pricing of loans already has led to a considerable 
expansion in credit to borrowers who may once have been rationed out of the credit altogether.  
Many of the borrowers in the subprime market are minorities or families or individuals with 
low incomes – borrowers who could not in the past and still cannot qualify for credit in the 
prime market.  The development of the subprime market has changed all that.  As Federal 
Reserve Governor Edward Gramlich has recently noted, between 1993 and 1998 conventional 
mortgages extended to Hispanic-Americans and African-Americans increased by 78 and 95 
percent, respectively – far outdistancing the economy-wide 40 percent increase in such lending 
[Gramlich, 2000].  
 
Gramlich concludes that much of this increase is attributable to the expansion of the 
subprime market.  As shown in Chart 1, during this same period, the number of subprime loans 
increased roughly ten-fold, from about 80,000 to nearly 790,000.  Chart 2, indicates that from 
1994 to 1999, the dollar volume of subprime mortgage originations increased by nearly a factor 
of five, from $35 billion to $160 billion, in the process climbing as a share of all mortgage 
originations from 4.5 percent to 12.5 percent.  
                                                 





Subprime Mortgage Originations* 
Chart 1 
Number of Subprime Refinance Loans 
























































































































































Subprime Originations Subprime Originations as a Percent of Total Origininations
* Source:  U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and U.S. Department of 
















































Subprime MBS/ABS Securitization, 1994-1999 
Subprime loans are extended primarily by non-depository institutions, such as finance 
companies, that are not regulated by state or federal agencies for safety and soundness and 
other purposes.  Depository institutions or their affiliates nonetheless have incentives under the 
Community Reinvestment Act, which obligates depository institutions to meet the credit needs 
of their local communities, to extend credit to subprime borrowers, who tend to be the LMI 
borrowers and residents of LMI areas whom the CRA was designed to benefit.  Since 1997, 
there has been a small, but noticeable increase of subprime mortgage lending by depository 
institutions or their affiliates [Belsky, et al.].
3  Furthermore, although the two major housing 
government-sponsored enterprises – Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – are not currently 
significant participants in the subprime market, both have begun to purchase mortgages in the 
upper reaches of that market (A- loans, for example) [HUD/Treasury Report, at 46].  Indeed, in 
June 2000, Fannie Mae announced a new product, its Timely Payment Rewards Mortgage, 
which is eligible to A- credits and entails an interest rate that starts out 2 percentage points 
below the subprime rate and drops automatically if the borrower makes 2 years’ of payments 
on time [Raines].  
 
Chart 3 shows that subprime lending has also been facilitated by the “securitization” of 
such loans – the packaging of loans into securities that are bought by institutional investors 


























                                                 
3 The Final CRA Report by Treasury indicates that the proportion of mortgage loans extended by CRA-covered 
institutions to  prime borrowers fell from 99 percent in 1997 to 93 percent in 1999 [Belsky, et al].  
 
* Source:  U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and U.S. Department of 





The volume of securitized subprime loans jumped by more than seven-fold between 1994 and 
1998, before falling back a bit in 1999.  By enlarging the pool of potential investors in 
subprime loans, securitization has helped lower interest rates in this market just as it has in the 
market for conventional prime mortgage loans. 
 
 
II.  Abuses in the Subprime Market 
 
The benefit of the subprime market is that it has widened access to credit for many who 
previously could not qualify for it.  However, according to recent reports, certain subprime 
lenders have taken advantage of some borrowers, inducing them to agree to mortgages with 
onerous terms that the borrowers cannot realistically meet.  When the borrowers do default, 
they lose the equity in their homes to the lenders.  Moreover, since the abusive practices appear 
to be targeted at the elderly and residents of minority and low-income communities, a pattern 
of defaults can destroy property values and lead to increased crime in affected areas 
[HUD/Treasury Report, at 24-25].  
 
These “predatory lending” practices are easier to condemn than to define, however.  As 
the joint HUD/Treasury report noted in its analysis [at 17]:  
 
“Defining the practices that make a loan predatory, however, is a problematic task.  
Any list of predatory practices is destined to be incomplete because bad actors are constantly 
developing new abusive practices, sometimes to evade government regulation.  Furthermore, a 
list does not consider the context in which the alleged abuse has occurred.  Some practices may 
be considered abusive in the context of high-cost subprime loans; other practices may be 
deemed unacceptable in all contexts; and others – while not necessarily abusive for all high 
cost borrowers – are abusive in the borrower’s situation or because the borrower was misled or 
deceived.” 
 
The joint report nonetheless identifies four specific practices that seem to be 
characteristic of predatory lending: 
 
•  Loan flipping, or the repeated refinancing of loans in a short period of time in order 
for the lender to earn high fees (loan flipping is often accomplished through large 
balloon payments required over short maturities); 
 
•  Excessive fees, including large up-front charges and prepayment penalties, which 
are not related to the risks posed by the borrowers; 
 
•  The extension of unaffordable loans based on the assets, and not the income, of the 
borrower, a practice that frequently leads to default and foreclosure; 
 
•  Outright fraud or deception designed to conceal the true, onerous nature of the loan 
contract, typically from unsuspecting or unsophisticated borrowers. 
 
In short, predatory loans are those that would not have been made in more competitive 
markets and where borrowers are more fully informed about the credit alternatives available to 




just listed in geographic areas where there may be relatively few lenders and where the 
borrowers themselves are not financially sophisticated and thus relatively easy prey for 
unscrupulous lenders. 
 
It turns out, however, that most of the practices that are identified with predatory 
lending are already illegal under federal law.  In addition, although there is anecdotal evidence 
that these practices have occurred, there is no evidence indicating how frequent they are and 
how effectively enforcement of existing laws is addressing any problem.  
 
A. Current Laws Governing Predatory Lending Practices 
 
It is easy to overlook the fact that most, if not all, of the practices associated with 
predatory lending already are against federal law or are being addressed by the Federal 
Reserve. 
 
The broadest federal response is reflected in the Home Ownership and Equity 
Protection Act (HOEPA), enacted by Congress as part of the Riegle Community Development 
and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994.  Beyond the disclosure requirements embodied in 
HOEPA that are discussed below, the Act also prohibits certain terms in mortgage loans 
covered by the Act:  those carrying an annual percentage rate (APR) of more than 10 
percentage points above the yield of Treasury securities of comparable maturity or points and 
fees exceeding 8 percent of the loan amount or $400, adjusted for inflation since 1994.
4  In 
addition, covered loans may not:  (1) contain certain onerous prepayment penalties;
5 (2) charge 
an interest rate after default that is higher than the rate prior to the default; and (3) in most 
cases, require a balloon payment on a loan with a maturity less than five years.  Furthermore, a 
lender may not engage in a pattern of extending loans covered by HOEPA (“HOEPA loans”) 
that do not take account of the borrower’s ability to pay (income); and where a home 
improvement contract is involved, the creditor may not pay the contractor directly.  
 
HOEPA also gives the Federal Reserve Board broad regulatory authority to prohibit 
additional practices it finds to be unfair or deceptive, not just for HOEPA loans but all 
consumer mortgage loans.  In late 2000, the Fed outlined a series of major regulatory proposals 
pursuant to its HOEPA authority.
  The proposals would ban loan flipping within the first 
twelve months of a HOEPA loan (unless refinancing is in the borrowers’ interest); prohibit 
lenders from replacing a zero or low cost loan with another higher cost loan (unless the 
refinancing is in the borrowers’ interest); strengthen the existing prohibition on loans based on 
homeowners’ equity (rather than income) by establishing a rebuttable presumption against the 
creditor if it doesn’t document and verify the borrowers’ income; and prohibit lenders from 
including “payable on demand” or “call provisions” in HOEPA loans.  
 
In short, apart from outright fraud or misrepresentation – which already is punishable 
by state law – federal law either addresses or proposes to address each of the elements of 
                                                 
4 The current dollar threshold is about $465.  As discussed below, the Federal Reserve Board may adjust the APR 
threshold up or down by 2 percentage points.  
5 A prepayment penalty may be imposed only if the borrowers’ total monthly debt payments are less than 50 percent 
of his or her income; the prepayment is not made with funds borrowed through a loan made by the same creditor or 
its affiliates; the penalty does not apply more than five years after the mortgage was taken out; the prepayment 




predatory lending listed above and cited by the joint HUD/Treasury Report and other critics of 
predatory lending practices.  A key challenge, therefore, as the joint HUD/Treasury Report 
recognizes [at 113], is for the Administration and the Congress to provide the federal agencies 
with responsibility for enforcing HOEPA and other related mortgage laws – the Federal 
Reserve Board, the Departments of Justice and Housing and Urban Development, and the 
Federal Trade Commission – with sufficient resources to carry out their mandates.  In this 
regard, it is noteworthy that the FTC in particular has worked with the Justice Department to 
bring and successfully settle a number of cases in the past two years alone against various 
unscrupulous lenders for violating HOEPA and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 
which bans discrimination against applicants for credit on the basis of their age, race, sex or 
other prohibited factors [Medine].  
 
B.  Disclosure and Reporting Requirements Designed To Expose Predatory 
Lending 
 
Federal law not only prohibits certain practices associated with predatory lending, but 
also contains numerous disclosure and reporting requirements relating to mortgage loans 
generally and to subprime HOEPA loans in particular.  
 
The disclosure requirements are designed to make consumers aware of the true cost of 
credit so that they can better comparison shop among alternative providers of credit.  The Truth 
in Lending Act (TILA), for example, requires all lenders of closed-end credit, including 
mortgage loans, to disclose, among other things:  the annual percentage rate (APR) charged on 
the loan, the amount of the loan itself, and the total of all payments required.  TILA, which is 
administered by the Federal Reserve Board under its Regulation Z, also gives borrowers a right 
to rescind certain mortgages, generally within three days of closing, and authorizes individuals 
to recover actual or statutory damages.  The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) 
supplements the TILA disclosures with a requirement that lenders of “federally-related” 
mortgage loans disclose settlement costs when borrowers are applying for a loan and again at 
the time of closing. RESPA also prohibits kickbacks and referral fees. 
 
Federal law also requires mortgage lenders to provide information about their loans to 
the federal government, which enable it and the press to shine a spotlight on potentially 
onerous lending.  Notably, HOEPA requires mortgage lenders to disclose information about 
their loans if they have an APR greater than 10 percentage points above the Treasury rate for 
loans of comparable maturity, or the points and fees paid by the borrower exceed 8 percent of 
the loan amount, or $400 (adjusted annually since 1994 for inflation).  HOEPA gives the 
Federal Reserve Board, which is charged with collecting the data, the authority to vary the 
APR reporting trigger 2 percentage points either way.  In late 2000, the Fed proposed lowering 
the HOEPA reporting trigger by the maximum amount, to 8 percent, as well as mandating that 
lenders alert consumers in advance of loan closing that the amount they borrow may be 
substantially higher than requested (due to the financing of insurance, points, and fees). 
 
One criticism of the HOEPA reporting requirements is that the “APR trigger” is too 
high.  As the HUD/Treasury report indicates (at 85-86), very few subprime loans at least as of 
late 1999 – less than 1 percent – exceeded the statutory reporting requirement, loans with an 




data, this percentage would go up substantially, to roughly 5 percent, under the 8 percentage 
point trigger proposed by the Fed.  
 
Those urging that the reporting threshold be lowered still further should recognize that 
the Federal Reserve already, as a practical matter, has addressed this issue with its recent 
proposal unveiled in November 2000 to amend its Regulation C, issued pursuant to The Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).   Among other things, this proposal would require an 
expanded group of mortgage lenders (both depository institutions and covered non-
depositories) to report the APR on all their mortgage loans and whether the loans are covered 
by HOEPA.
 6  With this information, the Board will be able to identify and report the 
distribution of mortgage loans by interest rate, so that policymakers, citizens and advocacy 
groups will have a clearer idea of how many high-cost mortgage loans are being made.  The 
enforcement agencies should also be able to use this information to better target their 
investigation efforts against those lenders with a consistent practice of making very high cost 
loans (and thus where predatory lending may exist).  
 
C.  Subprime Lending is Not the Same as Predatory Lending 
 
Recent reports on predatory lending have documented that subprime lending is 
concentrated among minority and low-income borrowers [HUD/Treasury Report, at 46-47; 
ACORN; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development].  Because the practices said to 
constitute predatory lending are concentrated among subprime lenders, a strong inference of  
these reports is that minority and low-income borrowers are disproportionately the victims of 
unscrupulous lending practices. 
 
While this inference may be true, it is also important for policymakers and citizens not 
to equate subprime or high cost lending with predatory lending.  The same joint 
HUD/Treasury study that highlighted the abuses among some subprime lenders also 
documented that, as a class, subprime mortgages are more risky than prime loans or mortgages 
insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) – which is the reason they are subprime.  
In 1998 and 1999, for example, subprime mortgages were 5 times more likely to be delinquent 
(loan payments past due) than prime mortgages (13.5 percent versus 2.8 percent) [HUD and 
Treasury, 2000, pp 34-35].  Similarly, Chart 4 shows that the “serious” delinquency rate (loans 
past due 90 days where foreclosure proceedings have started) rises significantly as credit scores 
decline, underscoring a central feature of the subprime lending market:  that interest rates 
reflect the risks posed by borrowers with different financial characteristics.  
 
In fact, federal banking regulators have warned banks about the risks inherent in 
subprime lending.  In an interagency guidance released in March 1999, the four federal 
regulators -- the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and 
the Office of Thrift Supervision --  noted that “due to their higher risk, subprime loans 
command higher interest rates and loan fees than those offered to standard risk borrowers. 
These loans can be profitable, provided the price charged by the lender is sufficient to cover  
                                                 
6 Under current Board regulations, a non-depository lender is covered by the HMDA reporting requirements if its 
home purchase originations (including refinancings) equaled or exceeded 10 percent of its total loan volume. The 
proposed rule retains the 10 percent test but adds an alternative test:  if the total annual volume of mortgage 
lending exceeds $50 million.  Since the average dollar amount of a mortgage loan reported under HMDA is about 






































higher loan loss rates and overhead costs related to underwriting, servicing and collecting the 
loans.” (emphasis added) [Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, et al.]. On 
January 31, 2001, the federal banking agencies officially recognized this fact by imposing 
significantly higher capital requirements on depositories that have above-average 
concentrations of subprime loans, or those with qualifying subprime loans collectively greater 
than 25 percent of the institution’s Tier I capital (essentially shareholders’ equity). These 
institutions must hold capital that is 1.5 to 3 times higher than the amount typically required for 





                                                 
7 According to the new regulatory guidelines, a subprime loan is one which a borrower has a FICO score of 660 or 
below; at least two 30-day delinquencies in the past year; a debt service-to-income ratio of 50 percent or more; a 
declaration of bankruptcy within the past five years; or a foreclosure, repossession, or chargeoff in the preceding 
24 months. 
Chart 4 
Serious Delinquency Rate for Subprime Borrowers,  
Third Quarter 1999 
* Source:  U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and U.S. Department of 








III.  Recent Local and State Initiatives Aimed At Preventing Predatory Lending 
 
Notwithstanding the panoply of federal laws that already deal with predatory lending, a 
number of local and state governments have adopted ordinances and statutes aimed at the 
problem.  Although these interventions have many common elements, they differ in key 
respects, which not only complicates the legal landscape for national lenders, but increases 
uncertainty in the market, to the potential detriment of the very population of minority and low 
income individuals these local and state laws are designed to protect.  This danger is especially 
worrisome given the evidence indicating the positive effects that federal antidiscrimination 
laws and the Community Reinvestment Act have had on lending to minorities and low income 
households and neighborhoods [Litan, et al, 2000; Belsky et al, 2001]. 
 
Generally speaking, the state and local provisions apply or propose to apply stiff 
penalties – fines, imprisonment, and prohibition of city or state business with the offending 
institution – for either “high cost” or “predatory loans”, which are defined by a combination of 
some numerical threshold (based on APR and points/fees) plus at least one specifically 
identified practice.  Table 1 summarizes the thresholds and the penalties in some of the 
currently enacted and proposed statutes.  Table 2 provides a list of offending practices, which 
most (but not all) of the laws and proposals identify.  As illustrated by the asterisks in Table 2, 
virtually all of the practices punishable (now or potentially) at the state and local level are 
already prohibited under federal law.  
 
What is the harm in having state and local governments add their own enforcement 
efforts to those of the federal government?  Aren’t these lower levels of government supposed 
to be “laboratories of democracy”, where different and potentially innovative practices can be 
tried out, so that perhaps federal policymakers can learn from best practice and then copy? 
 
In many areas of policy, these arguments for devolution are quite valid, especially 
where the problems being addressed vary in nature across the country.  But in other areas of 
social policy – social insurance, broad areas of regulatory policy, energy and transportation 
policy, among others – federal policy predominates, and often appropriately so.  Market 
failures that are common across the country may deserve a uniform response.  Varying state 
and local responses can also drive up costs of addressing social problems where they interfere 
with the functioning of national markets. 
 
There are several reasons why an exclusive federal response is appropriate for dealing 
with predatory lending.  First, as is highlighted in Table 2, virtually all of the lending practices 
that the states and localities have condemned or would condemn, already are punishable by 
federal law.  The “laboratory” argument, therefore, does not apply in the case of predatory 
lending.  The “experiment” has been run at the federal level and federal laws have been passed 






Key Features of State/Local Ordinances on Predatory Lending 
 
Location  APR and Point/Fee Trigger  Penalty 
 
Ordinances Enacted: 
   
Chicago  APR >6% above Treasury for 
first mortgages; APR >8% over 
Treasury for second mortgages; 
or Points/fees >5% of loan if 
$16,000 or greater; or $800 
otherwise 
 
No business with the city 
North Carolina  Points/fees >5% of loan if less 
than $20,000; otherwise >8% 
of loan amount or $1000 
(whichever is lower) 
 
 
Ordinances Proposed:     
Baltimore  APR >6.5% over Treasury; or 
Points/fees >4% of loan; or 
$800 (if loan < $20,000) 
 
Fine/imprisonment 
No city deposits/investments 
with offending institution 
Philadelphia  APR >6.5% over Treasury for 
first mortgages; APR >8% over 
Treasury for second mortgages; 
Points/fees >4% of loan or 
$800 
 
Loss of business license and 
any city business 
Oakland  APR >8% above Treasury; or 
points/fees >6% of loan 
amount 
 
No business with offending 
institution 
Washington, D.C.
8  APR substantially greater than 
that justified using borrowers’ 
credit score and underwriting 
criteria of the federal housing 
GSEs or other agencies; or 
points/fees >2% of the loan, or 
$400 
 
Damages; reformation of the 






                                                 
8 At this writing, the D.C. Council had passed and the Mayor had signed an ordinance addressing predatory lending, 








State and City Predatory Lending Offenses, Proposed or Enacted 
(* Denotes Practice is Addressed or Proposed to be Addressed Under Federal Law) 
 
*  Unfair and deceptive practices 
 
*  Prepayment penalties above some threshold 
 
*  Balloon payments at less than certain maturities  
  Baltimore:  15 years 
  New York:  7 years 
  Oakland:  7 years 
  Washington, D.C.:  7 years, 3 months 
 
*  Loan flipping 
 
 Single premium credit life insurance (already unlawful if not disclosed to the borrower*) 
 
* Loans to borrowers without regard to capacity to repay (typically, statutes presume a borrower’s    
ability to pay if his or her total debt repayments are less than 50% of monthly income) 
 





Even so, not much is known about the true extent of remaining predatory practices, 
beyond the anecdotes that have been provided in testimony that have served as the basis for 
various reports.  The federal disclosure rules, both under HMDA and HOEPA, should change 
that.  If it eventually emerges that the predatory lending problem is more extensive or is of a 
different nature than currently envisioned, then history demonstrates that a federal response – 
either from regulators acting under existing law or from Congress – will be forthcoming. 
 
Second, various state and local ordinances in the meantime can chill legitimate 
subprime lenders from channeling credit to the borrowers in that market, which as the critics of 
predatory lending have noted, are disproportionately minorities or low income households.  
This is especially the case where the triggers defining predatory lending are vague and the 
penalties for engaging in the practice – however state and local officials may define it – are 
severe.  A good example is the Washington, D.C. ordinance, whose proposed trigger is an APR 
that is higher than one justified by the borrower’s credit score, using the underwriting criteria 
of the federal housing GSEs (Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac) or other federal agencies.  Such a 




legitimate lending, especially given the harsh penalties lenders would face for violation – 
actual and punitive damages, and fines.  
 
Third, even bright line tests can have the same chilling effect – discouraging perfectly 
lawful lending.  A staff memorandum prepared for the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors, 
for example, noted in connection with the Board’s recently proposed lowering of the HOEPA 
reporting trigger that while covering even more loans under the Act would extend the Act’s 
protections, “greater coverage could have a chilling effect and raise regulatory costs in a 
segment of the subprime mortgage market.  This might deter interest of some predatory lenders 
in the market.  It seems unlikely this effect would be restricted to predatory lenders alone, 
however, and it could cause some potential legitimate competitors to forego entry into this 
market where competition currently is alleged to be low.” (emphasis added) [Durkin and 
Canner, at 3-4].  In fact, one major subprime lender – Countrywide Credit – withdrew from the 
North Carolina market in January, citing the state’s law against predatory lending [Bergquist].  
Another major lender – EquiCredit, a subsidiary of Bank of America that is the largest bank-
owned subprime lender in the United States – told the Federal Reserve during the summer of 
2000 that the North Carolina statute would reduce its lending volume by roughly 30 percent in 
the state and predicted that the Chicago ordinance could cause as much as a 60 percent drop in 
its lending in that city [Eggers, 2000]. 
 
There is a danger that other ordinances – especially those with lower numerical 
thresholds than those proposed by the Federal Reserve for reporting under HOEPA – could 
also ration out creditworthy borrowers, especially those to whom federal law (through the 
Community Reinvestment Act) now encourages depository lenders to serve.  After all, usury 
laws used to be widespread in this country until policymakers realized that limits on lending 
interest rates had the effect of rationing credit.  With securitization of subprime lending having 
become a national market, subprime lenders have thus far been able to expand the supply of 
credit to those borrowers by developing uniform products that apply equally to borrowers 
wherever they live.  A balkanization of laws affecting the subprime market – with differing 
standards on the fringes of that market, predatory loans – threatens that uniformity and should 
make it more expensive for national lenders to extend credit in a perfectly legitimate way to 
subprime borrowers.  
 
Finally, there is an implicit assumption running through some of the local ordinances 
that high cost lending, by itself, is somehow predatory.  As already shown, subprime loans 
carry interest rates that are higher than those that are charged prime borrowers because 
subprime borrowers are riskier.  This is not only recognized in the marketplace, but federal 
regulators have cautioned banks about such risks in subprime lending and required depository 
lenders with high concentrations of such loans to maintain higher capital than other banks, 
precisely because of the risks involved.  It is therefore a mistake for policymakers to equate 
high cost lending with predatory lending. 
 
Fortunately, not all localities that have considered or are considering predatory lending 
ordinances are doing so in ways that threaten the availability of subprime credit.  A resolution 
in Cleveland, for example, while reflecting similar sentiments against predatory lending as 
have been expressed in other existing or proposed ordinances, departs from the emerging 




cooperation between local officials and community based organizations to accomplish that 
objective.  Such an approach complements existing efforts at the federal level. 
 
 
IV. Recommendations and Conclusion 
 
There is already ample federal legislation on the books aimed at exposing and curbing 
predatory lending.  The great danger now is that further measures, before the dimensions of 
any remaining problems are known and however well intentioned such additional steps may 
be, could nonetheless impede the normal flows of credit to the very borrowers who are claimed 
to be most vulnerable to predatory practices.  In particular, the proliferation of different state 
and local lending rules threatens to balkanize the lending market and make it very costly, and 
potentially impossible, for lenders to offer nationally uniform mortgage loan contracts.  If 
lenders are unable to do so, their costs will be higher and those costs are certain to be passed on 
to the consuming public, especially underserved borrowers.   
 
Under these conditions, the prudent course is for governments at all levels to refrain 
from adopting additional legislation until the data the Federal Reserve collects under HMDA 
and HOEPA can be fully analyzed.  This will permit an assessment of both the prevalence of 
high-cost lending and the effectiveness of existing enforcement efforts against predatory 
lending.  A cautious approach to predatory lending does not counsel inaction, however.  
Congress and the states should appropriate sufficient funds to ensure that the agencies charged 
with enforcing existing statutes designed to stop specific predatory lending practices have the 
financial means to do so.  The same is true for counseling efforts to continue educating 
consumers about their credit alternatives and the dangers of entering into mortgage loans that 
have terms characteristic of predatory loans.  
 
The market for subprime loans is also about to become significantly more competitive 
because the leading credit scorer, Fair Isaac, has announced plans to make available 
individuals’ scores over the Internet, together with interpretations of their meaning, beginning 
in March 2001 [Kingson].  The disclosure of credit scores will help level the playing field 
when borrowers apply for mortgage credit.  In the process, it should go a long way, if not all 
the way, toward eliminating the practice of lenders failing to channel qualified borrowers into 
the prime market.  Furthermore, armed with their credit scores, borrowers will be better able to 
comparison shop before they sign any mortgage.  
 
In sum, federal law is now about to be reinforced by market forces to help curb 
predatory lending practices.  Moreover, federal policymakers have put in place a data reporting 
and collection system that will shed light on the workings of the mortgage market.  It is vital 
that policymakers, therefore, not rush to judgment and enact “laws of unintended 
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